EX PARTE QUIRIN PDF

Ex Parte Quirin{| U.S. 1fn1|1}. Nos. ___, Original. MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITIONS FOR. WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS. and. United States ex rel. EX PARTE QUIRIN. 3. 1. Syllabus. States.•. and went behind such lines, contrary to the law of war, in civilian dress for the purpose of committing hostile. United States, Ex Parte Quirin et al. EX PARTE QUIRIN ET AL.; UNITED STATES EX REL. QUIRIN, ET AL. v. COX, PROVOST MARSHAL [ ] OPINION: MR.

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A federal court quirih refuse to issue a writ of habeas corpus where the facts alleged in the petition, if proved, would not warrant discharge of the prisoner.

Presentation to the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia of ec petition for habeas corpus was the institution of a suit, and denial by that court of leave to file the petition was a judicial determination of a case or controversy reviewable by appeal to the U.

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and in this Court by certiorari. The President’s Proclamation of July 2,aprte that all persons who are citizens or subjects quidin, or who act under qkirin direction of, any nation at war with the United States, and who during time of war enter the United States through coastal or pxrte defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile acts, or violations of the law of war, “shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals,” does not bar accused persons from access to the civil courts for the purpose of determining the applicability of the Proclamation to parre particular case; nor does the Proclamation, which in terms denied to such persons quirinn to the courts, nor the enemy alienage of the accused, foreclose consideration by the civil courts of the contention that the Constitution and laws of the United States forbid their trial by military commission.

In time of war between the United States and Germany, petitioners, wearing German military uniforms and carrying explosives, fuses, and incendiary and time devices, were landed from German submarines in the hours of darkness, at places on the Eastern seaboard of the United States.

Thereupon they buried the uniforms and supplies, and proceeded, in civilian dress, to various places in the United States. All quirij received instructions in Germany from an officer of the German High Command to destroy war industries and war facilities in the United States, for which they or their relatives in Germany were to receive salary payments from the German Government.

They also had been paid by the German Government during their course of training at a sabotage school, and had with them, when arrested, substantial amounts of United States currency, which had been handed exx them by an officer of the German High Command, who had instructed them to wear their German uniforms while landing in the United States.

Specification 1 of the charges on which they were placed on trial before a military commission charged that they. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. Articles 15, ed and 46 of the Articles of War, enacted by Congress, recognize the “military commission” as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war not ordinarily tried by courts-martial.

And by the Articles of War, especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases.

Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, by the Articles of War has exercised its authority under Art.

And by Article of War 15, Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war and which may constitutionally be included within that partw. This Court has always recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the.

The offense charged in this case was an offense against the law of war, dx trial of which by military commission had been authorized by Congress, and which the Constitution does not require to be tried by jury.

By the law of war, lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war; unlawful combatants, in addition, are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. It has long been accepted practice by our military authorities to treat those who, during time of war, pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, as unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission.

This practice, accepted and followed by other governments, must be regarded as a rule or principle of the law of war recognized by this Government by its enactment of the Fifteenth Article of War. Citizens of the United States who associate themselves with the military arm of an enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.

It is a construction which has been followed since the founding of our government, and is now continued in the 82nd Article of War. Such a construction is entitled to great respect. Since violation of the law of war is adequately alleged in this case, the Court finds no occasion to consider the validity of other specifications based on the 81st and 82nd Article of War, or to construe those articles or decide upon their constitutionality a so construed.

Leave to file petitions for habeas corpus in this Court denied. Orders of District Court 47 F. The Chief Justice announced that the Court had convened in Special Term in order that certain applications might be presented to it and argument be heard in respect thereto. Therefore, said the Attorney General, ez for all the respective parties in this proceeding joined in urging the Chief Justice to participate in the consideration and decision of the matters to be presented.

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Royall, of counselor the petitioners, concurred in the statement and request of patte Attorney General. The applications, seven in number ante, p. Provost Marshal of the Military District of Washington, who, pursuant to orders, was holding them qiirin that District for and during a trial before a Military Commission constituted by an Order of the President of the United States.

During the course of the argument, the petitioners were permitted to file petitions for writs of certiorari, directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to review, before judgment by that Court, orders then before it by appeal by which the District Court for the District of Columbia had denied applications for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus. After the argument, this Court delivered a Per Curiam Opinion, disposing of the cases footnote, p.

A full opinion, which is the basis of this Report, was filed with the Clerk of the Court on October 29, Cox, Provost Marshal; No. Cox, Provost Marshal, and No. Motions for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus were then presented to this Court, and the merits of the applications were fully argued at the Special Term of Court convened on July 29, Counsel for petitioners subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the order of the District Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and they have perfected their appeals to that court.

They have presented to this Court petitions for writs of certiorari before judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, pursuant to 28 U. The petitions are granted. In accordance with xe stipulation between counsel for petitioners and for the respondent, the papers filed and argument had in connection with the applications for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus parye made applicable to the certiorari proceedings.

It now announces its decision and enters its exx in each case, in advance of the preparation of a full opinion, which necessarily will require a considerable period of time for its preparation and which, when prepared, will be filed with the Clerk. These cases are brought e by petitioners’ several application for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus in this Court, and by their petitions for certiorari to review orders of the District Court for the District of Columbia, which denied their applications for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus in that court.

The question for decision is whether the detention of petitioners by respondent for trial by Military Commission, appointed by Order of the President of July 2. After denial of their applications by the District Court, 47 F. In view of the public importance of the questions raised by their petitions and of the duty which rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty, and because, in our opinion, the public interest required that we consider and decide those questions without any avoidable delay, we directed that petitioners’ applications be set down for full oral argument at a special term of this Court, convened on July 29, The applications for leave to file the petitions were presented in open court on that day, and were heard on the petitions, the answers to them of respondent, a stipulation of facts by counsel, quirrin the record of the testimony given before the Commission.

While the argument was proceeding before us, petitioners perfected their appeals from the orders of the District Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and thereupon filed with this. We granted certiorari before judgment for the reasons which moved us to convene the special term of Court. In accordance with the stipulation of counsel, we treat the record, briefs and arguments in the habeas corpus proceedings in this Court as the record, briefs and arguments upon the writs of certiorari.

On July 31,after hearing argument of counsel and after full consideration of all questions raised, this Court affirmed the orders of the District Court and denied petitioners’ applications for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus.

By per curiam opinion, we announced the decision of the Court, and that the full opinion in the causes would be prepared and filed larte the Clerk. The following facts appear from the petitions or are stipulated. Except as noted, they are undisputed.

All the petitioners were born in Germany; all have lived in the United States. All returned es Germany between and All except petitioner Haupt are admittedly citizens of the German Reich, with which the United States is at war. Haupt came to this country with his parents when he was five years old; it is qukrin that he became a citizen of the United States by virtue of the naturalization of his parents during his minority, and that he has not since lost his citizenship.

The Government, however, takes the position that, on attaining his majority he elected to maintain German allegiance and citizenship, or in any case that he has, by his conduct, renounced or abandoned his United States citizenship.

For reasons presently to be stated we do not find it necessary to resolve these contentions. After the declaration of war between the United States and the German Reich, petitioners received training at a sabotage school near Berlin, Germany, where they were instructed in the use of explosives and in methods of secret writing.

The four were there landed from the submarine in the hours of darkness, on or about June 13,carrying with them a supply of explosives, fuses, and incendiary and timing devices. While landing, they wore German Marine Infantry uniforms or parts of uniforms. Immediately after landing, they buried their uniforms and the other articles mentioned and proceeded in civilian dress to New York City. The remaining four petitioners at the qhirin French port boarded another German submarine, which carried them across the Atlantic to Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida.

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Ex Parte Quirin | law case |

On or about June 17,they came ashore during the hours of darkness, wearing caps of the German Marine Infantry and carrying with them a supply of explosives, fuses, and incendiary and timing devices. They immediately buried their caps and the other articles mentioned, and proceeded in civilian dress to Jacksonville, Florida, and thence to various points in the United States. They also had been paid by the German Government during their course of training at the sabotage school, and had received substantial sums in.

United States currency, which were in their possession when arrested. The currency had been handed to them by an officer of the German High Command, who had instructed them to wear their German uniforms while landing in the United States. Pursuant to direction of the Attorney General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation surrendered custody of quirln to respondent, Provost Marshal of the Military District of Washington, who was directed by the Secretary of War to receive and keep them in custody, and who thereafter held petitioners for trial before the Commission.

On July 3,the Judge Advocate General’s Department of the Army prepared and lodged with the Commission the following charges against petitioners, supported by specifications:.

Violation of Article 81 of the Articles of War, defining the offense of relieving or attempting quigin relieve, or corresponding with or giving intelligence to, the quiron. The Commission met on July 8,and proceeded with the auirin, which continued in progress while the causes were pending in this Court.

On July 27th, before petitioners’ applications to the District Court, all the evidence for the prosecution and the defense had been taken by the Commission and the case had been closed except for arguments of counsel. It is conceded that, ever since petitioners’ arrest, the state and federal courts in Florida, New York, and the District of Columbia, and in.

While it is the usual procedure on an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts for the court to issue the writ and on the return to hear and dispose of the case, it may without issuing the writ consider and determine whether the facts alleged by the petition, if proved, would warrant discharge of the prisoner.

Presentation of the petition for judicial action is the institution of a suit. Hence, denial by the district court of leave to file the petitions in these causes was the judicial determination of a case or controversy, reviewable on appeal to the Court of Appeals and reviewable here by certiorari. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. Petitioners’ main contention is qhirin the President is without any statutory or constitutional authority to order the petitioners to be tried by military tribunal for offenses with which they are charged; that, in consequence, they are entitled to be tried in the civil courts with the safeguards, including trial by jury, pare the Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee to all persons charged in such courts with criminal offenses.

The Government challenges each of these propositions. But regardless of their merits, it also insists that petitioners must be denied access to the courts, both because they are enemy aliens or have entered our territory as enemy belligerents, and because the President’s Proclamation undertakes in terms to deny such access to the class of. It is urged that, if they are enemy aliens or if the Proclamation has force, no court may afford the petitioners a hearing.

But there is certainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for determining its applicability to the particular case. And neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners’ contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission.

As announced in our per curiam opinion, we have resolved those questions by our conclusion that the Commission has jurisdiction to try the charge preferred against petitioners.

Ex Parte Quirin – Significance

There is therefore no occasion to decide contentions of the parties unrelated to this issue. We pass at once to the consideration of the patre of the Commission’s authority. We are not here concerned with any question of the guilt or innocence of petitioners. Ex parte Milligan, supra, 71 U. But the detention and trial of petitioners — ordered by the President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger — patre not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.

Congress and the President, like the courts, possess no power not derived from the Constitution. And finally, the Constitution authorizes Congress. The Constitution confers on the President the “executive Power,” Art. The Constitution thus invests the President, as Commander in Chief, with the power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry into effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the government and regulation of the Armed Forces, and all laws defining and punishing offenses against the law of nations, including those which pertain to the conduct of war.

By the Articles of War, 10 U. It has provided for the trial and punishment, by courts. But the Articles also recognize the “military commission” appointed by military command as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment quitin offenses against the law of war not ordinarily tried by court martial. Articles 38 and 46 authorize the President, with certain limitations, to prescribe the procedure for military commissions.

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